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8.1  Introduction 
Between  1955 and  1970, the  share of  owner-occupied housing  in  total 
household net wealth hovered around 21 percent. In the nine years between 
1970 and 1979, housing wealth climbed to 30 percent of net wealth (Board of 
Governors 1991).’ During the 1970s, the increased value of owner-occupied 
housing delivered a $700 billion windfall (in 1986 dollars) to homeowners. 
While the share of housing has since fallen to 28 percent, it is likely that con- 
sumption and saving decisions by American households have been affected by 
this fundamental shift in the size and composition of U.S. household wealth. 
How has this shift in housing prices affected aggregate capital accumula- 
tion? Will the combination of higher long-term inflation rates and higher real 
housing prices since the 1970s depress future nonresidential saving? The first 
goal of this paper is to survey the growing literature on life-cycle housing deci- 
sions to shed light on these issues. Such empirical and theoretical studies have 
examined the “tilting” of real mortgage payments during periods of high infla- 
tion, the down-payment constraint, the introduction of home equity loans, mo- 
bility decisions of the elderly, and the impact of uncertainty in asset returns- 
including housing assets-on  household portfolios. The implication of these 
studies appears to be that both higher real housing prices and higher inflation 
rates should have only a small impact on aggregate capital accumulation in the 
long run. 
Jonathan Skinner is professor of economics at the University of Virginia and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author  is especially  grateful to Jonathan Feinstein,  Don  Fullerton, Patric  Hendershott, 
Charles Horioka, Martin Feldstein, James Poterba, and conference participants for insightful sug- 
gestions, and to Daniel Feenberg and Marjorie FIavin for assistance with data sources. 
1. Wolf (1989) calculated that owner-occupied equity as a fraction of total wealth in  1980 was 
at its highest level in this century. 
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Most of the theoretical work has been couched in terms of steady-state com- 
parisons between equilibrium solutions. In the theoretical models, shifts in the 
underlying structure of the model are anticipated, and the economy has time 
to adjust to the new regime.  For those who rode the tide of higher housing 
prices in the  1970s and parts of the  198Os, the shift in housing wealth  was 
largely unanticipated and the economy’s response largely short-run in nature. 
The second goal of this paper is to examine how the unexpected wealth  in- 
crease in the 1970s affected both individual portfolios and aggregate saving 
behavior in the short run. 
The standard  life-cycle  model  predicts  that  an  unanticipated  increase  in 
housing wealth should have a much larger impact on aggregate saving in the 
shortterm. Homeowners are predicted to increase consumption in response to 
the windfall. Indeed, some economists have attributed the low saving rate in 
the 1980s to the consumption behavior of homeowners unlocking their housing 
capital gains with home equity loans or by drawing down other assets. When 
the life-cycle model is expanded  to include a bequest  motive,  however, the 
answer is less clear. In 1988, the Economist conjectured that “most of those 
who inherit their parents’ home . . .  will regard the proceeds of their parents’ 
thrift as an insurance against poverty in their old age. So, for the time being, 
they will save, converting  their parents’  physical  assets into financial equity 
of their own.” (April 9, 1988, 13). 
That is, the question of whether housing windfalls are spent or passed along 
to future generations is crucial to understanding how the housing windfall has 
affected aggregate saving. As is shown below, the evidence is not entirely clear 
on this  question;  aggregate  data  appear  to support the notion that  housing 
wealth  is spent, but microeconomic  data suggest that the housing  wealth  is 
saved. 
The converse of this unexpected wealth enjoyed by existing homeowners is 
the unexpected high housing prices faced by potential house buyers. The third 
goal of the paper is to examine how higher housing prices affects current rent- 
ers. In comparing saving behavior across metropolitan areas, Sheiner (1990) 
found that higher housing  prices encourage saving for the now larger down 
payment.  That is, the shift in housing prices-particularly  in urban  areas- 
could have indirectly spurred overall wealth accumulation by the young. 
The final goal is to measure how the fundamental change in housing values 
has affected the riskiness of household portfolios. Are current younger house- 
holds facing greater economic uncertainty as a result of overleveraged houses? 
I use the Survey of  Consumer Finances from 1969 and 1986 to show that the 
ratio of mortgage principal to housing value actually declined during the pe- 
riod, suggesting that households are not at appreciably greater risk from highly 
leveraged housing. If families are not more leveraged, then are they at greater 
risk from volatile housing prices? Evidence from the Panel Study of  Income 
Dynamics (PSID) suggests that housing prices were only slightly more vari- 
able in the late 1970s than they were in the late 1960s. 193  Housing and Saving in the United States 
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Fig. 8.1  Housing prices and  housing real capital gains, 1950-89 
Sources: McFadden 1992; Federal Reserve System, various years. 
The next section documents the broad-based change in the housing wealth 
of the United States during the 1970s. First, the dramatic capital gains in hous- 
ing wealth during the 1970s are documented using aggregate data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank's balance sheets. Second, microeconomic evidence from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances in  1969 and 1986 is used to establish two 
empirical regularities: housing equity makes up a majority of total wealth for 
the median household, and housing equity grew relatively uniformly between 
1969 and 1986 across both age and income groups. That is, changes in housing 
value during the 1970s had a major impact on the asset positions of a large 
fraction of U.S. households.2 
8.2  An Overview of Housing Wealth 
Figure 8.1 shows the real index of housing prices between 1950 and 1989 
based on the Commerce Department deflators for housing prices and quality 
indices (McFadden 1992). Following gradual stagnation of  housing prices in 
the 1950s and 1960s, prices turned up sharply by  18 percent in the 1970s be- 
fore a decline in the 1980s. 
These price shifts led to substantial changes in wealth holdings. Figure 8.1 
2. By contrast, changes in the value of  financial wealth such as stocks affect consumption and 
saving decisions  of  only the  28 percent  of  families  that own  any  stocks at all (Mankiw and 
Zeldes 1991). 194  Jonathan Skinner 
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Fig. 8.2  Ratio of housing to nonhousing wealth, and mortgage to housing 
wealth, 1955-90 
Sources: Federal Reserve System, various years. 
documents the magnitude of capital gains-or  wealth appreciation net of new 
investment-in  the housing market. Using  1950 as the benchmark, Federal 
Reserve Board data on housing and landholdings are used to calculate accumu- 
lated real capital gains in owner-occupied housing.’ By the end of  the 1970s, 
accumulated capital gains in housing neared $1 trillion. To express this in an- 
other way,  average capital gains in housing between  1970 and 1978 was 42 
percent of average real personal ~aving.~ 
Housing has become a more important element in the aggregate wealth port- 
folio. Figure 8.2 graphs the ratio of owner-occupied housing assets to net non- 
housing  wealth between  1955 and 1990.5  This ratio has grown from 0.31 in 
the  1960s to a high of 0.49 in  1979, when housing was at a high and stock 
markets at a low, before declining through the 1980s. Even in 1990, this ratio 
was 15 percentage points higher than in 1965. 
The ratio of mortgage debt to total housing wealth, reported in figure 8.2, is 
a good measure of the degree of leverage in housing markets. Not surprisingly, 
the ratio of mortgages to housing wealth fell during the 1970s to a low of 0.35 
3. As McFadden (1990) notes, his price index excludes changes in land prices. However, his 
index matches the pattern of wealth changes quite closely, and those wealth changes include land. 
4. Personal saving does not include capital appreciation in housing. 
5.  Note that this aggregate measure includes nonhousing wealth of renters as well as homeown- 
ers. Net nonhousing wealth is calculated as net wealth less durables less owner-occupied housing 
and land. Unfortunately, assets of trust and nonprofit organizations are included with these house- 
hold figures. See Board of Governors (1991). 195  Housing and Saving in the United States 
Table 8.1  Housing Equity and Tenure, 1986 
Equity/  Median Equity/ 
Age  Homeowner (%)  Net Worth  Net Worth 
Under 31  40.4  ,480  ,597 
3 1-40  57.5  ,443  .604 
41-50  70.5  ,354  ,563 
5 1-60  78.3  ,287  ,613 
61-70  70.9  ,239  ,545 
Over 7  1  65.0  .264  ,611 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1986. 
in  1979-mortgages  tend to be fixed nominally and adjust slowly over time, 
while the value of housing changes more rapidly. What is more surprising is 
that even during the mixed housing markets of  the 1980s, the leverage ratio 
has more than rebounded from its previous low level. By  1990, the ratio was 
58 percent, 23 percentage points higher than the equivalent ratio in 1965. Some 
part of the increase was caused by the relatively tax-favored status of housing 
mortgages following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Aggregate household wealth measures are useful for assessing changes in 
the overall capital stock, but given the skewed distribution of wealth, they pro- 
vide less information about the extent to which households are affected by the 
changes in asset value. For example, one might expect that changes in the stock 
market might affect the consumption of  households that own stock, but 72 
percent of  households own no stocks at all (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991). To 
measure the extent to which housing price changes might affect consumption 
choice across households, I use microeconomic data from the 1969 and 1986 
Survey of  Consumer Finances. While they share the same name, the 1969 sur- 
vey  was administered by  the Michigan Survey Research Center and focused 
largely on durable and automobile purchases, so the wealth data are less com- 
plete than for the 1986 survey.6 
Table 8.1 presents summary statistics on home ownership and the share of 
housing  wealth  to  total  wealth  for  the  1986 sample  only,  with  families 
weighted to be representative of the total p~pulation.~  The first column tabu- 
lates the percentage of  families in that age group who own a house. The per- 
centage who own houses rises from 40 percent under age 3 1 to a peak of 78.3 
percent for ages 5  1-60. 
Focusing on the importance of housing in the wealth portfolio for homeown- 
6.  The unit of observation is neither the family or the individual, but the automobile. Hence a 
family with three cars would appear in the sample three times. The subsequent analysis has cor- 
rected for this unusual weighting scheme. 
7. Observations were deleted if income was below $2,000 or if-for  homeowners-either  the 
house market value was less than $2,000 or if mortgage payments were not made on a monthly 
basis. A total of 2,726 observations remained, of which 2,148 represented homeowners. 196  Jonathan Skinner 
Table 8.2  Housing Equity and Income by Age, 1969 and 1986 
Housing 
Equity, 
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41-50  69.41 1 
5  1-60  74,560 
61-70  76,397 


























Source: Survey of  Consumer Finances 1969, 1986. 
ers, table 8.1 details the aggregate share of housing equity to total net wealth 
for each age group. Aggregate housing equity accounts for less than half of 
total net wealth, with the fraction falling to roughly one-quarter at ages above 
5  1. These fractions are not representative of the typical family, however, be- 
cause of the highly skewed distribution of nonhousing wealth. A better meas- 
ure of  the importance of  housing is the (weighted) median ratio of  housing 
equity to net household wealth, again broken down by age. Table 8.1 suggests 
no age trend in this ratio; the median homeowner holds slightly more than half 
of his wealth in housing equity regardless of age. That is, at least in the 1986 
cross-section,  housing  equity  and  nonhousing  wealth  is  accumulated  at 
roughly the same rate as homeowners age. 
Were the aggregate increases in housing wealth concentrated within a few 
age groups or income groups? Table 8.2 details the changes, for homeowners, 
in housing equity and income in constant 1986 dollars. There is a consistent 
rise in the real value of home equity across age groups, with the largest in- 
crease, 75 percent, for those aged 41-50.* In part, these increases may be a 
consequence of the overall rise in family income during the same period. But 
as table 8.2  shows, the average increase in real income was at most half of the 
percentage increase in home equity, at least for those under the age of 61. 
The increase in home equity across income groups was not as evenly distrib- 
uted. For homeowners only, table 8.3 presents a comparison of housing equity 
in 1969 and 1986 by income decile, once again expressed in 1986 dollars? For 
most deciles, real housing equity rose by roughly 50 percent over the period. 
Not every group experienced an increase in housing equity; decile 3 registered 
8. These are not comparisons among “synthetic cohorts”; a homeowner who was 28 in 1969 
9. The income deciles were created by the Survey of  Consumer Finances for the entire sample. 
would have been in the “<31” category in that year but in the “51-60”  category in 1986. 
Hence the subsample of homeowners is likely to be underrepresented in the lower deciles. 197  Housing and Saving in the United States 
a 13 percent decline. By contrast, housing equity for the highest income decile 
more than doubled. 
In summary, despite its relatively small share of total national wealth, hous- 
ing is a dominant asset for the majority of  American households that own 
homes. The dramatic changes in housing wealth during the past two decades 
were  widely  distributed  across  many  groups,  although  middle-aged  and 
higher-income families appeared to have experienced the greatest growth in 
housing equity between 1969 and 1986. Section 8.3 addresses a much harder 
issue, which is how this broad-based change in wealth might be expected to 
affect long-term capital accumulation. 
8.3  Housing in the Life-Cycle Model 
The life-cycle model of consumption is the standard workhorse for analyz- 
ing housing and saving decisions. This section reviews the basic results arising 
from the theoretical models, and asks how well these models explain the ob- 
served changes discussed in  section 8.2. I restrict the  analysis  to  owner- 
occupied housing. 
It is easiest to begin with a partial equilibrium life-cycle model under com- 
plete certainty. If  moving costs were negligible, financing considerations ig- 
nored, housing perfectly divisible (either rented or owner-occupied), and capi- 
tal  markets  perfect, then  the life-cycle model  would predict  that  housing 
consumption would be chosen continuously in conjunction with other types of 
consumption. Housing investment could then be chosen according to an opti- 
mal portfolio rule, but it would not necessarily be equal to optimal housing 
consumption. 
Table 8.3  Housing Equity and Income by Decile, 1969 and 1986 
Change in  Change in 
Housing  Equity,  Family  Income, 
Equity,  1969-86  Income,  1969-86 



















































Source: Survey of  Consumer Finances 1969, 1986. 198  Jonathan Skinner 
A number of  authors have pointed out the implausibility of  such a model 
and have introduced a variety of factors to make the analysis of housing more 
realistic. They have focused on (1) a down-payment constraint, (2) equality 
between  housing  held  for consumption  and  housing  held  for investment, 
(3) moving costs, and (4) high initial real mortgage payments during an infla- 
tionary period, or “tilt.” 
Restrictions by banks on borrowing lead to minimum requirements not only 
for current income, but also for current liquid wealth. Hence high lifetime- 
income but low current-wealth families could be constrained by higher hous- 
ing prices either to defer home ownership or to begin with a smaller (“starter”) 
house at early ages. Jones (1990), for example, found that the presence of liq- 
uid assets was a very strong positive predictor of home ownership, holding 
current earnings constant, in a sample of young Canadians. Liquid wealth may 
have a weaker impact on housing demand in the United States; in Canada, 
mortgages neither allow tax-deductible  interest payments nor twenty-thirty- 
year loan periods. 
The second complication in typical housing markets is that the consumption 
of owner-occupied housing is typically limited by the amount invested (Hen- 
derson and Ioannides 1983). This constraint, coupled with a minimum house 
size, implies not only that households must balance consumption demand for 
housing with optimal investment choices, but that the lumpy nature of housing 
may leave their wealth portfolio highly undiversified for moderate lengths of 
time. 
Moving costs introduces a third element of rigidity (or “stickiness”) to hous- 
ing choices. Grossman and Laroque (1990) develop an elegant generalized 
model of  durable purchases and show that  small moving costs may lead to 
considerable rigidity in durable (or housing) consumption. This result suggests 
that changes in the timing of housing consumption over the life cycle have 
relatively little impact on lifetime utility. The intuition is as follows: Suppose 
that without adjustment costs a family would move six times during the life 
cycle. With the introduction of a small adjustment cost, the family moves only 
four times. Hence the utility loss (in dollar terms) of the existence of adjust- 
ment costs is bounded from above by only twice the small adjustment cost.l0 
Finally, high persistent inflation rates coupled with fixed nominal mortgage 
interest payments leads to a “tilting” of real mortgage payments (Kearl 1979; 
Schwab 1983). Inflation raises the nominal interest rate and thereby increases 
the fixed nominal mortgage interest payment. This in turn tilts the real mort- 
gage interest flows toward earlier payments. While the nominal payment is 
fixed for the life of the mortgage, the real payment gradually declines over 
time. For example,  Schwab (1983) considers two thirty-year  mortgages  of 
$20,000, each with a real interest rate of 3 percent (and ignoring tax issues). 
In the first case, inflation is zero, and real (and nominal) annual payments are 
10. In practice, of course, adjustment costs may be substantial. 199  Housing and Saving in the United States 
$1,020. In the second case, the inflation rate is 8 percent and the nominal rate 
11 percent. Real mortgage payments vary from $2,130 in the first year to only 
$229 in the final year. 
Suppose that the increase in housing prices during the 1970s was a perma- 
nent change. According to the theoretical model, housing purchases are likely 
to  be  deferred  because  of  down-payment  constraints  and  the  restrictions 
on borrowing. The equality of housing investments and housing consumption 
may  further  discourage  purchases  of  housing,  since  a  larger  expenditure 
share would also imply a larger and less balanced portfolio share of housing. 
Mobility  may  also  rise  as  households  must  closely  match  housing  size 
with their current (rather than future) income."  The consequent rise in adjust- 
ment costs from more frequent moves might further reduce the demand for 
housing. 
How would housing prices affect overall saving? Obviously, a higher house 
price implies fewer nonhousing assets. To the extent that families defer house 
purchases,  overall  (nonhousing)  saving  may  be  increased.  For  example, 
Krumm and Kelly (1989) present evidence that saving rises prior to the house 
purchase to meet the down payment, and after the house purchase to rebuild 
liquid assets. Still it is unlikely in the aggregate that changes in the time path 
or in the composition of housing and nonhousing  consumption will have a 
large impact on aggregate  capital accumulation. Hayashi, Ito,  and Slemrod 
(1988) developed a life-cycle model to test how higher housing prices would 
affect aggregate saving. They applied the model to the Japanese economy and 
suggested that the higher Japanese housing prices relative to the United States 
account for only a small fraction of the overall differences in saving rates be- 
tween the two countries. 
Inflation is predicted to have an ambiguous impact on housing demand. The 
tilt effect tends to encourage the deferral of housing purchases and to reduce 
the total quantity of housing (Schwab 1983; Kearll979). Because the tilt effect 
increases real mortgage payments when the house is purchased (from $1,020 
to $2,130 in the example above), prospective home buyers may find that limita- 
tions on mortgage payments as a fraction of current income require them to 
come up with a larger down payment. Hence inflation could render the mini- 
mum down-payment constraint superfluous. 
Offsetting this effect is the potential tax advantage of home ownership in an 
inflationary world. The nominal  appreciation of  owner-occupied  housing  is 
essentially untaxed.12  Hence when inflation and the nominal interest rate both 
rise in tandem (the orthodox Fisher effect), both the real return on alternative 
11. That is, suppose that anticipated earnings in the future are large. A family might choose to 
purchase a larger house now to avoid the transactions costs of moving in the future. With more 
expensive housing prices (and a tilt in mortgage payments), families are less able to anticipate 
future housing demand because of down-payment or mortgage constraints. 
12. The effective tax rate on housing wealth gains is very low because of the $125,000  allow- 
ance for capital gains of housing for owners over age fifty-five and the stepped-up basis at death. 200  Jonathan Skinner 
nonhousing investment and the real cost of mortgage financing fall, conferring 
a greater advantage to home ownership over other forms of wealth. 
Housing would not benefit from inflation in the presence of taxation if nomi- 
nal interest rates rose by  a sufficient amount to keep the after-tax real return 
~nchanged.'~  The intuition is that the after-tax rate of  return on alternative, 
nonhousing assets is unchanged in the presence of heightened inflation, so the 
asset value of housing is similarly unchanged. There is little evidence to sup- 
port this modified Fisher effect; empirical evidence suggests that nominal in- 
terest rates rise by at most the change in inflation (Tanzi 1980; Melvin 1982). 
Goodwin (1986) finds that the tax-inflation benefits and the tilt effect roughly 
cancel each other out, implying that anticipated inflation has a neutral impact 
on housing demand in the long term. 
How might inflation affect the degree of leverage in the house? On the one 
hand, households may seek to increase their initial leverage rate because of the 
shortened real duration of their m01tgage.I~  On the other hand, bank require- 
ments restricting the ratio of  nominal mortgage payments to nominal income 
would restrict leverage, forcing new home buyers to provide larger down pay- 
ments. As  is shown in section 8.7, the empirical result that leverage rates have 
not changed dramatically between 1969 and 1986 lends some credence to the 
view that these two effects also offset one another. 
One potential solution to the tilt problem currently being considered by the 
U.S. government is to offer inflation-adjusted mortgage policies. Under this 
plan, households would pay only the real interest rate (nominal interest minus 
inflation), with the inflation premium rolled back into the mortgage principal. 
Kearl(l979) suggested that such a plan would increase the demand for housing 
substantially. Of course, by stimulating demand for an asset that already enjoys 
tax advantages, the net impact on nonresidential saving and government reve- 
nue might be negative. 
The orthodox life-cycle model has strong predictions about the housing de- 
cisions of the elderly-they  should be dipping into home equity and possibly 
downsizing their home. Section 8.4 examines in more detail the empirical sup- 
port for these predictions. 
8.4  Housing Demand by the Elderly 
Housing is both a consumption good and an investment good. While the 
life-cycle model may  have  little to say  about consumption by  the elderly, it 
does imply that retired households should gradually spend down both housing 
and nonhousing wealth. A number of recent studies, however, have found little 
13. That is, the nominal interest rate would rise by  1/(1 -  f) points for every point increase in 
the inflation rate, leaving the real after-tax return on nonhousing equity unchanged (Darby 1975). 
Berkovec and Fullerton (1989) address this issue in a general equilibrium setting. 
14. That is, the inflation tilt loads real mortgage payments in earlier years, thereby reducing the 
effective length of the loan. 201  Housing and Saving in the United States 
evidence of the gradual downsizing of home equity implied by the life-cycle 
model (Memll 1984; Venti and Wise  1989, 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 
1989). In fact, these studies have found that retired households on average are 
as likely to increase their housing equity as to decrease it. Merrill (1984) re- 
ports that more retired households switch from renters to owners than from 
owners to renters, not a transition normally associated with life-cycle “down- 
scaling.” Additional evidence comes from Feinstein and McFadden ( 1989), 
who suggest that more than one-third of elderly households reside in dwellings 
with at least three more rooms than the number of inhabitants, and are hence 
“overconsuming” housing services. 
Despite the apparent inability of the life-cycle model to explain such phe- 
nomena, it cannot yet be discarded as a model of retirement housing demand 
for a number of reasons. First, the life-cycle model places no restrictions on the 
housing consumption choice of the elderly (see also Ioannides 1989a). Absent 
evidence that housing choices of the elderly violate restrictions on utility, the 
demand for housing services may simply be stronger at older ages (e.g., Venti 
and Wise 1990). Alternatively, the decline in the user cost of housing for older 
families (Ai et al. 1990) could induce relative price effects for housing as well. 
Furthermore, Sheiner and Weil (1992) present persuasive evidence that el- 
derly households do reduce their housing services, although the reduction gen- 
erally occurs later in the life cycle and is often precipitated by widowhood.I5 
For example, the home-ownership rates of  all women aged 65-69  is 77 per- 
cent; by ages 80-85,  the percentage drops to 59, with less than half owning 
their own house after age 85. They also report that for widows, home owner- 
ship falls by  12 percentage points and median home equity by roughly 30 per- 
cent, in the four years after the husband’s death. Based on comparisons of home 
ownership for  high-  and  low-income households,  they  suggest that  these 
changes in housing tenure are a consequence of taste changes rather than fi- 
nancial necessity.I6 
Suppose that retired households are consuming housing optimally. A portfo- 
lio model of the life cycle might still predict that households should attempt to 
spend down their home equity.” But as Memll(1984), Venti and Wise (1989), 
and others have shown, housing equity for the elderly generally increased dur- 
ing the period of  analysis. How can this finding be reconciled with the life- 
cycle model? 
There are at least two possible explanations. The first is that the size of home 
equity is not large, so that the gains to tapping into home equity through re- 
15. Venti and Wise (1989) and Feinstein and McFadden (1989) earlier noted the strong impact 
of  events such as widowhood, children’s moving, or divorce on mobility decisions, but  did not 
directly test the impact of such changes on ownership patterns. 
16. Feinstein and McFadden (1989), however, suggest that families with both low incomes and 
low  levels of liquid wealth are  more likely to  switch from owner-occupied to rental  property 
conditional on moving. 
17. Alternatively, individuals could spend down other types of assets but  leave housing equity 
unchanged. However, such a strategy would lead to an unbalanced portfolio. 202  Jonathan Skinner 
verse mortgages is light.I8 For example, Venti and Wise (1991) suggest that 
the reverse mortgage would supplement income for the median retired families 
by between 4 and 10 percent of their existing income. In short, the transactions 
costs of reaching the home equity may not be worth the minimal extra income. 
A different explanation for why home equity was observed to increase for 
elderly families is that the period of time covered by the Retirement History 
Survey-the  predominant source of data on elderly housing-was  also a pe- 
riod during which housing prices rose substantially. So increases in home eq- 
uity may not have been a conscious life-cycle plan by retired households, but 
rather the outcome of housing windfalls. 
McFadden (1992) has developed a model of housing demand and supply 
to predict the future trends in housing prices based on projected income and 
demographic changes. His preliminary results suggest that the capital appreci- 
ation in housing enjoyed by earlier cohorts will nearly evaporate for later co- 
horts, with real returns on housing dropping from an annual average of 3 per- 
cent (for cohorts born between 1880 and 1900) to roughly 0.5 percent for the 
baby boom generation. While McFadden’s estimates are not as pessimistic as 
those of Mankiw and Weil (1989), they suggest that future patterns of home 
equity  could  display  earlier  and  more  pronounced  downsizing  by  retired 
households. 
To this point, much of the theory has been largely in terms of steady-state 
or at least stationary equilibrium. I next turn to a consideration of how both 
existing and prospective homeowners were affected by the largely unantici- 
pated shift in housing wealth after the 1970s. 
8.5  Housing Price Appreciation and Saving by Current Homeowners 
The saving slowdown of the  1980s has spawned many explanations. One 
explanation is that housing wealth windfalls have stimulated consumption. Be- 
cause capital gains from housing and land are not included in national income 
and product accounts, a rise in the price of  housing will have no impact on 
measured income but could cause consumption to rise. Thus the declining sav- 
ing rate (as conventionally measured) may be a consequence of increased con- 
sumption by homeowners flush with windfall capital gains. 
Such a view gains support from the simple life-cycle model. Because hous- 
ing is often held by older families, the aggregate marginal propensity to con- 
sume out of  housing  wealth tends  to be high.  Suppose that  an exogenous 
change in tax policy (Poterba 1984) causes the price of housing and land to 
increase.I9  Calculations from a life-cycle simulation model with fifty-five over- 
lapping generations suggest that a 10 percent increase in the real price of hous- 
18. One version of  a reverse mortgage annuity would involve a bank paying the household a 
19. Assume that land is in fixed supply so that despite new investment in housing, overall hous- 
fixed stream of income until death, at which point the bank takes title to the house. 
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ing (such as that during the past two decades) causes a short-term decline of 
3 percentage points in  saving (Skinner 1989). Ultimately, as the spendthrift 
generations die out and the new generations save more for the now more ex- 
pensive housing, aggregate saving rates and the capital stock (per worker) are 
predicted to rebound to near their previous levels. 
The theoretical implication that housing capital appreciation depresses non- 
housing saving depends on at least three assumptions: capital markets allow 
older families to spend their housing wealth, homeowners treat housing wealth 
similarly to other types of  wealth, and there is no bequest motive. Violating 
any of these assumptions implies an attenuated effect of housing capital gains 
on consumption. 
The 1980s saw the rapid growth of one popular method of freeing housing 
capital gains: the home equity loan. As Manchester and Poterba (1989) have 
documented, second mortgages as a fraction of total mortgages have increased 
from 3.2 percent of all home mortgages in 1980 to 10.8 percent in 1987. Their 
results using survey data suggest that, of each dollar from a home equity loan 
taken out subsequent to purchasing the house, other assets are reduced by 60- 
70 cents. One interpretation of this finding is that homeowners are successful 
at spending their windfall home equity gains. Alternatively, as the authors note, 
the result could also reflect differences in the population between those with 
home equity loans and those without. For example, unexpected medical ex- 
penses could lead both to a home equity loan and to a decline in other forms 
of  assets. However, the cumulative balance of  $100 billion in home equity 
loans is not large. Even starting from a zero balance in 1986, the average net 
increase in loans would have been only $20 billion annually, or less than 0.5 
percent of current national income. 
A further explanation for why housing wealth might not affect consumption 
and saving has been proposed by Thaler (1990). In his view of economic psy- 
chology, individuals control their spending impulses by creating “nonfungible” 
mental accounts that restrict certain forms of assets from being spent. If hous- 
ing is nonfungible, then windfalls from housing prices would not be spent. 
The final possibility is that the bequest motive will cause homeowners to 
save the accumulated wealth to assist their children in  purchasing the now 
more expensive housing. Two pieces of evidence point against this intergenera- 
tional altruism hypothesis in the United States. First, one might expect that 
families with children should save more of their housing windfall than those 
without children. There was no evidence for such differences in the panel re- 
gressions by Skinner (1989). 
Second, the altruism hypothesis would suggest that first-time home buyers 
might turn to parents or other relatives to help with more expensive housing. 
Some evidence on this proposition is provided by survey data from the Chicago 
Title and Trust Company (1991) on first-time home buyers. The real median 
house price for first-time buyers increased by  22 percent between 1976 and 
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of income, again for first-time buyers, rose from 23 percent to 36 percent. Yet 
the share of the down payment provided by  relatives actually fell, from 10.8 
percent in 1976 to 10.2 percent in 1990. 
The question of  whether housing wealth windfalls affect saving and con- 
sumption is empirical. There are three approaches to testing the hypothesis. 
First, aggregate linear time-series consumption functions have been estimated, 
using housing wealth as an independent variable. Bhatia (1987) and Hender- 
shott and Peek (1989), for example, found that consumption rose between 4 
and 5 cents per dollar of housing (or housing plus durable) equity. One short- 
coming of these time-series regressions is the lack of a utility function under- 
lying the estimating equation. Another problem is the potential for spurious 
correlation between consumption expenditures on the left-hand side of  the 
equation that includes an imputed flow of services from owner-occupied hous- 
ing, and the market  value of  housing wealth on the right-hand side of  the 
equation. 
A second approach is to estimate Euler equation regressions using aggregate 
time-series data. For example, Skinner (1993) used aggregate data between 
1950 and  1989 to estimate that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
was roughly 0.03 percent per one percentage point increase in housing wealth, 
although the coefficient was not significant at conventional levels. (Note that 
nondurables exclude housing services and make up only one-third of total con- 
sumption expenditures.) The estimated long-term impact of housing windfalls 
on consumption, however, was essentially zero. 
The third approach is to use microeconomic panel data. An important study 
by Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) documented the dramatic decline 
in household saving during the 1980s, using both the Survey of  Consumer Fi- 
nances (SCF) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). They found that 
much of the observed decline in saving rates between 1963 and the 1980s (in 
the case of the SCF) and between 1972-73  and the 1980s (in the case of the 
CES) occurred among homeowners. For example, using the SCF, the saving 
rate declined by 6.29 percent for homeowners between 1963 and 1983-85 but 
by only 0.49 percent for renters. These tabulations suggest that homeowners 
spending their windfalls were behind the saving decline in the 1980s. Surpris- 
ingly, the same pattern was not repeated in Canada. They calculated that, in 
Canada between 1978 and 1986, saving rates fell by 1.3 percent for homeown- 
ers and by 3.1 percent for renters. 
Another example of the microeconomic approach is by  Skinner (1989), who 
used the panel aspect of  the PSID to construct family-specific measures of 
consumption and housing value over time. Consumption is not directly avail- 
able from the PSID, although there are multiple indicators of  consumption 
reported, such as food consumption, restaurant consumption, utility payments, 
and number of automobiles. By weighting these components using regression 
coefficients from the CES, overall consumption was imputed for each family 
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changes in consumption (essentially the microeconomic counterpart of  the 
macro-Euler equations) suggested that housing price shifts had no effect on 
consumption.20  In short, the empirical evidence about the effects of  housing 
wealth on consumption are mixed. 
Are the upper ranges of empirical estimates-say,  an MPC out of housing 
wealth equal to 4 cents per dollar-large  or small by the standards of the life- 
cycle model? A life-cycle household enjoying a $100,000 permanent windfall 
in its housing price would not consider itself $100,000 wealthier, since the cost 
of housing services in the area has likely risen. The ‘‘true’’ windfall is the pres- 
ent value of the $100,000 capital gain when (or if)  thefamily sells the house. 
So if the windfall occurred in 1979 and the family planned to move in 2009 to 
an area with no real gain in housing prices, the present value of the windfall in 
1979 would have been only $100,000/(1 + T)~O, or $41,198, assuming a real 
discount rate of  3 percent.*] In this case, an estimated MPC out of  housing 
wealth of 0.0412 would imply a true MPC out of the present value of housing 
wealth equal to 0.10. 
The aggregate impact of housing wealth on consumption is a weighted aver- 
age across all age groups, with older households exhibiting a higher MPC out 
of housing windfalls. Calculations using a life-cycle model with fifty-five gen- 
erations suggest a short-run MPC from housing wealth of roughly 3 percent 
(Skinner 1989), well within the upper range of empirically estimated coeffi- 
cients. Using this 3 percent MPC and assuming a housing windfall of  $700 
billion during the 1970s (see figure 8.1), the implied increase in consumption 
is $21 billion annually, or only 0.6 percent of GNP in 1986. Housing prices by 
themselves are unlikely to have  explained the decline in saving during the 
1980s. 
8.6  Housing Price Appreciation and Saving by Potential Homeowners 
To  this point, I have focused on how the unexpected housing price increase 
affected existing homeowners. Price appreciation should also affect saving by 
renters who hope to purchase housing in the future.22  Wealth appreciation en- 
joyed by current homeowners on their fixed assets are matched dollar for dollar 
by a wealth loss for future generations who must pay  more for the existing 
housing stock. 
Sheiner (1990) has estimated that younger families in areas with high hous- 
ing prices also tend to save more, conditional on factors such as income, rental 
20. Pooled cross-section and time-series regressions, however, did suggest that housing wealth 
affects consumption. These pooled regressions may be tainted by the problem that spendthrifts are 
likely both to buy large houses and to spend a high fraction of income on other consumption goods. 
21. This calculation assumes no further real price appreciation in housing. If current capital 
gains are projected to increase in the future, the MPC out of housing wealth would be larger. 
22. Rental payments might also be expected to  change, although such effects are ignored in 
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payments, and other demographic variables. She finds that variation among 
states in housing prices are sufficiently large to account for a large fraction of 
wealth differences among renters. For example, a renter in California, the state 
with the highest housing prices, is predicted to hold $2,406 more in  wealth 
than a renter in Kentucky, the state with the lowest housing price. This differ- 
ence is larger than the average wealth holdings of the sample.23 
As Sheiner reports, her results may suggest that higher housing prices actu- 
ally encourage, rather than discourage, aggregate saving. If homeowners treat 
housing wealth as nonfungible and do not spend it, but renters save for the 
more expensive housing, then housing prices could paradoxically increase ag- 
gregate saving rates. 
There is some evidence that, beyond some threshold in housing prices, rent- 
ers give up hope of  ever affording owner-occupied housing and as a conse- 
quence reduce their saving. In response to a survey asking “How has the recent 
increase in land and housing prices affected your plans to save for housing 
purchase?’  only 5 percent of Japanese respondents replied that they would 
increase their planned purchase price, cut back on consumption, and increase 
saving. Thirty-two percent answered that they had abandoned their housing 
purchase plans entirely (Central Council 1990).’“ In short, if housing prices 
grow to the point  where prospective  buyers drop from the market,  saving 
among renters could decline rather than increase. 
8.7  Housing and Uncertainty 
Models that assume perfect foresight over the life cycle ignore the important 
role of risk in housing wealth and the impact of this risk on consumption deci- 
sions. The lumpy nature of  housing, as well as the typical equality between 
housing consumption and housing investment, means that portfolio decisions 
about housing investments cannot be derived in isolation from consumption 
decisions (Bossons 1978). 
Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) and Hendershott and Won (1992) have re- 
cently developed complex simulation models reflecting this interdependence 
between housing consumption  and investment. In their models, households 
face uncertain returns both on housing and nonhousing assets, and changes in 
the tax regime are shown to affect overall wealth both through the traditional 
incentive effect and through changes in the after-tax variance of the returns. In 
particular, Berkovec and Fullerton highlight the importance of financial risk in 
housing when they find that full taxation of owner-occupied housing has only 
small effects on the total quantity of housing. The disincentive effect of a tax 
23. While net worth of less than $2,000 may seem low, the sample is restricted to renters, and 
24. I am grateful to Charles Horioka for pointing out this survey to me. 
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on housing is nearly offset by the reduction in the variance of housing returns 
as a consequence of the tax. 
The Berkovec and Fullerton and Hendershott and Won models focus on the 
“hedging” demand for housing assets, in the sense that housing increases the 
risk of  the entire family portfolio. Goodwin (1986) focuses additionally on 
the “speculative” demand for housing portfolio. That is, when there is uncer- 
tainty about the (nominal or real) price of future housing, owning a house pro- 
vides excellent insurance against future (regional or local) price shifts. Hence 
under this view, purchasing housing can reduce, rather than increase, the total 
amount of uncertainty. Goodwin finds limited evidence that either the specula- 
tive or  the hedging affects are large, although his results may be an artifact of 
using aggregate data. 
To  what  extent are household portfolios disrupted by  the purchase of  a 
house? Ioannides (1989b) finds that the portfolio decisions of recent movers 
do appear constrained by mortgage lending requirements. That is, recent mov- 
ers with lower earnings (holding nonhousing wealth constant) show higher 
ratios of  equity to housing value, suggesting that they are constrained from 
leveraging their house by  bank lending restrictions tied to current earnings. 
This disequilibrium holds only for recent movers; portfolio decisions for non- 
movers appear unrelated to current earnings. 
The sharp changes in housing prices during the past few decades might be 
expected to have two effects. The first is an increase in the volatility of housing 
prices, so that owning a house induces more risk to family wealth. The second 
is higher leverage rates (i.e., the ratio of mortgage principal to housing value) 
for first-time buyers. Both a higher leverage ratio and greater price volatility 
would increase the riskiness of the household portfolio and hence reduce the 
demand for housing by risk-averse households. Could these two effects have 
explained in part the sluggishness in housing prices during the 1980s? To ad- 
dress this issue, I first test whether housing prices have become more volatile 
and then measure the changes in leverage ratios between 1969 and 1986. 
The PSID has followed five thousand families (and their dependents) since 
1968. In each year, the respondent was asked the market value of his or her 
house. Each of  the sample families yielded a maximum of nineteen observa- 
tions on housing price changes (from 1968-69  to 1986-87).  An  observation 
was deleted if  during the current or previous year the family had moved  or 
experienced a major compositional change, or did not own a house, or if  the 
real (1986) value of the house was less than $2,000. Nearly fifty-six thousand 
observations remained. 
Figure 8.3 graphs the year-to-year real annual change in housing prices, as 
well as its standard deviation, from 1968-69  through 1986-87.  (Log changes 
in excess of the absolute value of  1  .O were truncated at either 1 or -  1  .) As a 
rough measure of the accuracy of such subjective housing value measures, the 
log average annual rates of change were compared in figure 8.3 with the objec- 208  Jonathan Skinner 
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Sources: Panel Study of  Income Dynamics; McFadden 1992. 
tive Commerce Department measures (McFadden 1992). The two series are 
quite close in mapping housing price changes over the 1970s and 1980s and 
diverge only in the late 1960s. 
Figure 8.3 traces the standard deviation of real annual changes in housing 
prices. Despite the sharp run-up in housing prices during the 1970s (shown in 
figure 8.1), the change in the standard deviation of housing prices is relatively 
modest compared to the underlying pattern of  uncertainty. That is, housing 
prices since 1969  have always been volatile, with a standard deviation in excess 
of  0.18 in log terms (or roughly speaking, 18 percentage points). Hence one 
cannot conclude that homeowners have been exposed to a significant increase 
in overall housing price risk in the last few decadesz5 
Household portfolios are at greater risk when they are highly leveraged.26 
Data from the Chicago Title and Trust (1991) suggest a larger fraction of home 
buyers with high leverage rates; the fraction of families buying a house with 
less than 10 percent down payment rose from .27 in 1976 to .40 in 1989. 
To test this view that average homeowners have become more exposed to 
25. It should be cautioned that these housing figures are subjective rather than objective apprais- 
als. They tend to change in jumps-say,  a house is reported worth $25,000 in  1968 and 1969 and 
then rises in 1970 to $30,000--leading  to perhaps some overstatement of the true market volatility. 
Still, to the extent that housing demand and saving behavior reflects the subjective assessment of 
the household's net wealth, these measures are the appropriate ones to use. 
26. For example, suppose there are two homeowners, one with a leverage ratio of 50 percent, 
the other with a ratio of 90 percent. A one-percentage-point shift in house prices causes a 2 percent 
revaluation of equity for the first homeowner, but a 10 percent revaluation for the second. 209  Housing and Saving in the United States 
Table 8.4  Leverage of Housing by Age, 1969 and 1986 
Median  75th  Median  75th 
Age  1969  1969  1986  1986 
Leverage,  Percentile,  Leverage,  Percentile, 
~ 
Under 3 1  ,690  .859  ,563  .771 
3 1-40  ,531  .707  ,485  ,691 
41-50  .308  .567  ,249  ,486 
5 1-60  .ooo  ,339  ,034  ,250 
6 1-70  .ooo  .038  .Ooo  ,073 
Over 71  .ooo  .Ooo  .Ooo  .ooo 
Source: Survey of  Consumer Finances 1969, 1986. 
housing price risk, data from the SCF on leverage ratios were compiled in table 
8.4. Median and seventy-fifth-percentile leverage ratios (mortgage principal 
remaining divided by house market value) were calculated for both 1969 and 
1986. Median leverage ratios decline with age, so that the representative home- 
owner had nearly full equity in a house by age 5  1-60.  The comparison between 
leverage rates in 1969 and 1986 suggests there has been no overall increase in 
the leverage ratios of households. If anything, the leverage rates have declined 
since the late 1960s; for ages under 31, the median leverage rate fell from 69 
percent to 56 percent. As is also noted in table 8.4, this result holds not just 
for the median household, but for those “high exposure” families who are in 
the seventy-fifth percentile of leverage ratios. 
One way to reconcile the Chicago Title and Trust data with the SCF data is 
to note that equity is built up more rapidly in the presence of inflation. Taking 
a snapshot of  homeowners in  1990 would include some who may have pur- 
chased a house with very little down payment in, say, 1984, but subsequently 
experienced rapid equity buildup caused by inflati~n.~’  Note finally that, since 
1986, the leverage ratio for housing wealth rose substantially owing to the tax 
advantages of home equity lines of credit. However, such shifting may not 
imply greater overall leverage if accompanied by a reduction in revolving tax- 
able credit.28 
It might be argued that the leverage ratio is not relevant to household risk, 
and that a more relevant risk is whether the household can meet the mortgage 
payments. In this view, a rise in the ratio of mortgage payments to total income 
might indicate greater riskiness of home ownership. To test for this, table 8.5 
compares the ratio of mortgage payments to income in 1969 and 1986, broken 
down by age group. Table 8.5 shows a modest increase in the ratio of mortgage 
27. Note also that the average down payment for first-time buyers fell from 18 percent in 1976 
to 16 percent in 1990 (Chicago Title and Trust 1991). 
28. For example, Skinner and Feenberg (1990) found that housing mortgage interest payments 
increased by 60-80  cents for every dollar reduction in nondeductible  interest payments following 
the 1986 tax reform. That is, households shifted nonhousing debt into tax-preferred housing debt. 210  Jonathan Skinner 
Table 8.5  Mortgage Payments as a Percentage of Family Income, 1969 and 
1986 
Median  90th  Median  90th 
Age  1969  1969  1986  1986 
Payment,  Percentile,  Payment,  Percentile, 
Under 3 1  11.70  19.96  12.85  25.51 
3 1-40  10.50  17.33  11.73  24.78 
41-50  7.49  16.59  7.00  19.80 
5 1-60  0.00  16.92  2.08  17.64 
6 1-70  0.00  11.99  0.00  14.28 
Over 7 1  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.24 
Source: Survey Nf Consumer Finances 1969, 1986. 
payments to income between 1969 to 1986.  Families in the ninetieth percentile 
of mortgage payments (as a ratio to income) show a somewhat larger increase 
in the burden of mortgage payments. Still, the overall impact of changes in the 
riskiness of home ownership are likely to be quite modest for housing demand. 
8.8  Conclusion 
The sharp rise in housing prices during the 1970s has had an important im- 
pact on the financial health of many homeowners. During the entire decade of 
the 1970s, capital gains in housing alone approached $700 billion (in  1986 
dollars) and amounted to nearly half of all personal saving during the decade. 
During this same period, average inflation rates increased substantially; even 
ignoring the 1970s, inflation rates doubled from an average annual rate of 2.4 
percent in the 1960s to 5.0 percent in the 1980s. 
How might these two fundamental shifts be expected to affect the level and 
composition of long-term aggregate saving? The life-cycle model suggests that 
homeowners should respond to a long-term rise in housing prices by a reduc- 
tion in housing services. While families may wait longer before purchasing a 
house, theoretical studies do not suggest that the higher housing prices should 
depress aggregate capital accumulation in the long term. By the same token, 
inflation affects the tilt of  nominal housing mortgages and the tax advantage 
of housing, but the overall impact of inflation on housing markets is also likely 
to be small. 
The temporary effect of housing price windfalls may have had a larger effect 
on saving patterns in the United States. There is some evidence that homeown- 
ers have partially spent down their housing windfalls, although the evidence is 
not conclusive. Whether this accumulated housing wealth is being gradually 
spent down, saved for bequests, or saved because homeowners find it difficult 
to extract the home equity is an unresolved question. 
The life-cycle model also implies that potential homeowners currently rent- 211  Housing and Saving in the United States 
ing should save more as a consequence of higher housing prices. The study by 
Sheiner (1990) supports this view; variations in housing prices across cities 
are found to explain a large fraction of financial wealth holdings of renters. 
Still, if  housing prices are out of the reach of renters, they may respond by 
giving up entirely on home ownership and by saving less. 
Finally, how did the fundamental changes in housing prices and inflation 
affect the riskiness of household portfolios? The empirical evidence suggests 
little change over time, either in the housing leverage rates, or in the volatility 
of housing prices. We can therefore exclude increased housing risk as an expla- 
nation for laggard housing demand in the 1980s. 
This paper has ignored one key piece in explaining the puzzle of housing 
prices-why  the structural shift in housing prices  during the  1970s? Some 
authors have pointed to the interaction between inflation and the tax code- 
allowing nominal mortgage interest payments to be deducted implied an often 
negative real after-tax cost of borrowing during the 1970s (Poterba 1984). 0th- 
ers have stressed demographic changes in the age structure of the population 
as driving housing prices-the  baby boom coming of age accounted for the 
housing price rise and its subsequent decline (Mankiw and Weil 1989; see also 
Hendershott  1991).  It may be difficult to pinpoint how housing prices should 
affect saving rates without identifying what caused the dramatic shift in hous- 
ing prices in the first place. 
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